Decision-support methodology to assess risk in end-of-life management of complex systems by Villeneuve, Eric et al.
  
 
Open Archive TOULOUSE Archive Ouverte (OATAO)  
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and 
makes it freely available over the web where possible.  
This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ 
Eprints ID : 15532 
To link to this article : DOI : 10.1109/JSYST.2016.2522183 
URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2016.2522183 
To cite this version : Villeneuve, Eric and Béler, Cédrick and Pérès, 
François and Geneste, Laurent and Reubrez, Eric Decision-Support 
Methodology to Assess Risk in End-of-Life Management of Complex 
Systems. ( In Press: 2016) IEEE Systems Journal. ISSN 1932-8184 
Any correspondance concerning this service should be sent to the repository 
administrator: staff-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
Decision-Support Methodology to Assess Risk
in End-of-Life Management of Complex Systems
Éric Villeneuve, Cédrick Béler, François Pérès, Laurent Geneste, and Eric Reubrez
Abstract—End-of-life management of complex systems is
increasingly important for industry because of growing environ-
mental concerns and associated regulations. In many areas, lack
of hindsight and significant statistical information restricts the
efficiency of end-of-life management processes and additional
expert knowledge is required. In this context and to promote the
reuse of secondhand components, a methodology supported by
risk assessment tools is proposed. The proposal consists of an
approach to combine expert and statistical knowledge to improve
risk assessment. The theory of belief functions provides a com-
mon framework to facilitate fusion of multisource knowledge, and
a directed evidential network is used to compute a measure of
the risk level. An additional indicator is proposed to determine
the result quality. Finally, the approach is applied to a scenario
in aircraft deconstruction. In order to support the scientific con-
tribution, a software prototype has been developed and used to
illustrate the processing of directed evidential networks.
Index Terms—Belief functions, decision-support system,
directed evidential networks, end-of-life management, risk
assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
E ND-OF-LIFE aircraft deconstruction has been rapidlyincreasing for several reasons. First, there has been a
substantial increase in the the number of aircraft that have
reached their end-of-life in aircraft fleet. In addition, recent
regulatory changes have significantly increased the manufac-
turer liability regarding the management of end-of-life of their
aircraft. Finally, current environmental concerns encourage air-
craft manufacturers to include an environmental dimension in
their industrial strategies.
The study, presented in this article, was realized as part of the
“DIAGNOSTAT” project.1 This project focuses on the recovery
and reuse of parts as spares.
Certification is costly and it is therefore important to deter-
mine as soon as possible the suitability of deconstruction and
certification of a part by limiting the number of “physical”
examinations required. The objective of this work is to pro-
pose mechanisms to evaluate part status at a reduced cost
by assessing, a priori, the risk that a part may have defects.
Two information sources may provide knowledge to the model:
expert opinions and statistical data. The heterogeneity of these
information sources implies a need for hybridization of differ-
ent knowledge types. Hence, it is essential that uncertainty in
this process be taken into account for a coherent risk assess-
ment. In this context and to enable the reuse of secondhand
components, a methodology supported by risk assessment tools
is proposed and consists of an approach to combine expert and
statistical knowledge to improve risk assessment.
A generic risk assessment model was proposed based on a
literature review [1]. This model is based mainly on influence
diagrams and provides a risk assessment for a part or subassem-
bly of a system. Bayesian networks [2] and their extension,
influence diagrams, were used since they are able to model a
risk situation simply.
However, uncertainty modeling is complex because of the
limitations set by Bayesian formalism and specifically by the
underlying probabilistic mechanisms. Hence, the goal is to
model information that reflects expertise. Although probability
theory, which is used by the Bayesian network formalism, can
be used to quantify the randomness of information (variability),
it does not allow for easy integration of epistemic information
(incompleteness, imprecision). The symmetry or indifference
principle (equiprobability) does not distinguish between the
representation of a random situation and a partially described
context [3]. Within this framework, belief functions can be of
a great help. Belief functions are used to merge and integrate
this knowledge into the model. Consequently, their integration
into a graphical model similar to Bayesian network models has
been considered, and thus directed evidential networks are used
to perform a risk assessment by taking into account epistemic
uncertainty.
This paper introduces the proposed risk assessment method-
ology. The different phases of this process (knowledge for-
malization, information fusion, processing into the model, and
resulting indicators) are then described. Finally, current work
concerning an application of the risk assessment process to
aircraft deconstruction is presented.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
A. Risk
Literature contains many definitions of the risk concept [4].
These definitions often present risk as a combination of haz-
ard and vulnerability. The chosen definition is the one proposed
in [5], which defines risk as an event that occurs as an asso-
ciation between “cause events” that are characterized by their
occurrence (P), and “consequence events” (effects) that are
characterized by their severity or impact (I). Thus, risk can be
determined from R = f (occurrence, impact) = f (P, I).
Fig. 1. Representation of the risk sequence.
Fig. 2. Organization of the ERM subprocesses based on [8] and [9].
Traditionally, risk is defined by the relationship R = P × I ,
but literature contains many other formulations. For example,
the formula R = P × Ik [6] may be used to highlight risks with
high impact because of the coefficient k.
This vision can easily be extended to more complex risks
by using an event sequence (Fig. 1) where each risk situation
is composed of “cause events,” “consequence events,” and a
“target event.” It is possible to observe a chain of situations
(a “cause event” of a situation is a “consequence event” of
another, and vice versa) to study the root causes or the ultimate
consequences.
B. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)
ERM aims to facilitate the definition of an overall strategy for
an organization by identifying events that could affect it, and by
controlling these risks to provide reasonable assurance regard-
ing the objectives of this organization [7]. Fig. 2 introduces the
various phases of this process.
Many tools and methodologies have been developed in recent
years to instrument ERM subprocesses such as [10], [11] for the
identification phase, [12] for the control phase, [13], [14] for
the monitoring phase, or [5] for the feedback phase. The work
described in this paper takes place in the assessment phase of
ERM. This phase is usually carried out either by statistical data
analysis (quantitative approach) or by interviewing one or more
experts (qualitative approach). The proposed approach allows
one to assess the risk by following a dedicated methodology
which includes hybridization of expert knowledge and statis-
tical data and original measures of risk and uncertainty. The
objective is to obtain a quantitative analysis supported by exper-
tise in cases where the amount of data is insufficient for reliable
statistics. The proposed process is described in the next section.
C. Risk Assessment Process
The network structure, i.e., the event chain representing the
various studied risks (see Section II-A), is considered as known
and has been defined by experts in the field who identified
different possible defects with their associated causes and con-
sequences. This definition is the starting point for building the
network structure with arcs and nodes for a given system. All
nodes are also considered as discrete variables.
To edit and process expert and statistical knowledge, to
assess risk and communicate results via indicators, the pro-
posed process is divided into four successive phases.
1) The first phase, termed “knowledge formalization,” con-
sists of expert opinion elicitation and statistical knowl-
edge extraction, both of which result in belief functions.
2) In the second phase, termed “information fusion,” one
single belief function is obtained for a given set of infor-
mation (out of several potential sets). This information
may consist of several expert opinions and data records.
This resulting belief function is subsequently introduced
to the corresponding node of the network.
3) The third phase, termed “information processing,” is an
introduction of any new piece of information and its prop-
agation (evidential inference algorithms) throughout the
network nodes to update risk measures.
4) The last phase, termed “result restitution,” consists of an
interpretation of the final network state to provide the final
user with some understandable indicators.
As opposed to the usage of Bayesian networks, the relevance
of the chosen approach has increased because the use of belief
functions enables the representation of different information
sources. As mentioned previously, processing of belief func-
tions correctly takes into account the epistemic uncertainty that
is inherent in expert opinions as in sparse statistical data.
The following synoptic view (Fig. 3) is introduced to
describe further the required sequence of actions for this trans-
formation. It consists of a two-headed process with expert
opinion processing on one branch and statistical extraction on
the other.
III. KNOWLEDGE FORMALIZATION
In this section, belief function formalism is described and the
mechanisms used to formalize these two types of knowledge are
discussed.
A. Belief Functions, Transferable Belief Model (TBM)
The TBM is an adaptation by Smets [15] of the belief func-
tions’ theory developed by Shafer [16] to provide a general
framework to represent uncertainty. This generic knowledge
representation and combination formalism allows the modeling
and processing of imperfect knowledge resulting from multiple
sources.
Fig. 3. Synoptic view of approach to assess risk by using directed evidential networks.
The TBM interprets a belief function as the representation
of a rational agent opinion based on the belief or knowledge
state of this agent, even if it is inaccurate or incomplete. The
TBM is based on the assumption that reasoning under uncer-
tainty (credal level) and decision-making (pignistic level) are
two cognitive tasks of a different nature.
To model a problem using belief functions, the value of the
variable ω, which represents the system state, must be deter-
mined. The frame of discernment represents all possible n
values (or hypothesis) for the variable ω and is denoted by
Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn}.
The definition of the belief mass function, denoted
mΩ, allows the translation of an observation (or advice)
provided by an agent on the “power set” of Ω (denoted
2Ω = {∅, {ω1} , {ω2} , {ω1, ω2} , . . . , {ω1, . . . , ωn}}).
The power set consists of all subsets of Ω. The belief mass
function is defined as follows:
mΩ : 2Ω → [0, 1]
A ⊆ Ω → mΩ (A) ∈ [0, 1] . (1)
The basic belief assignment (BBA) is the set of belief masses
on the proposal A ⊆ Ω that satisfies the following equation:∑
A⊆Ω
mΩ (A) = 1. (2)
A BBA can be transformed to highlight information and to
ease the dynamic aspects of TBM, including the fusion rules.
The most commonly used transformations are presented here.
1) The credibility or belief (denoted bel) symbolizes the
minimum belief in proposal A
belΩ (A) =
∑
∅=B⊆A
mΩ (B) ∀A ⊆ Ω. (3)
2) The plausibility (denoted pl) represents the maximum
belief in proposal A
plΩ (A) =
∑
B∩A =∅
mΩ (B) ∀A ⊆ Ω. (4)
As stated previously, the TBM has two distinct cognitive lev-
els of reasoning. The transformation from credal to pignistic
level is termed pignistic transformation [15]. This nonreversible
transformation aims to reduce the BBA in a probability dis-
tribution so as to be compatible with decision theory. This
probability distribution, denoted BetP, can be obtained from the
following equation:
BetP
{
mΩ
}
(ωi) =
∑
A⊆Ω, ωi∈A
mΩ(A)
|A|
(1−mΩ (∅)) ∀ωi∈Ω. (5)
Fig. 4. Connections between credal and pignistic levels.
Fig. 4 shows the connections between the credal and pignistic
levels via the notions of credibility, plausibility, and pignistic
probability.
B. Expert Opinion
Usually, experts express their opinions using subjective prob-
abilities [17]. Subjective probabilities are a simple way to
model a person’s belief in a hypothesis. An expert gives
his opinion according to the frame of discernment Ω =
{ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn} which is exhaustive and contains discrete
and independent values.
These probability distributions are then transformed using
the inverse pignistic transformation [18]. The objective of the
inverse pignistic transformation is to determine, from a pignis-
tic probability distribution BetPΩ, the least committed BBA,
which respects the least commitment principle [19].
This transformation requires the singletons of Ω to be
ordered such that
BetPΩ (ω1) ≥ BetPΩ (ω2) ≥ · · · ≥ BetPΩ (ωi)
≥ · · · ≥ BetPΩ (ωn)
with n = |Ω|. (6)
The least committed BBA, composed of nested focal ele-
ments A = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωi}, can be obtained using the inverse
pignistic transformation such that
mˆΩ (A) = |A| × (BetPΩ (ωi)− BetPΩ (ωi+1))
with BetPΩ (ωn+1) = 0 and A = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωi}. (7)
Based on the opinion of the expert formalized as a BBA,
information about the source reliability can be integrated
through a mechanism termed “discounting” [16]. The goal of
discounting is to weight all BBA elements by a factor (1− β)
termed reliability. The discounting rate, denoted β, is defined
on the interval [0, 1]. To respect the least commitment prin-
ciple [19], the remaining mass after weighting is assigned to
Ω, which represents the total uncertainty. This mechanism adds
some ignorance to the BBA with respect to the reliability of the
source. Application of the discounting rate, according to (2),
corresponds to the following formula:
βmΩ (A) = (1− β) .mΩ (A) ∀A ⊂ Ω
βmΩ (Ω) = (1− β) .mΩ (Ω) + β. (8)
C. Statistical Opinion
Statistical knowledge results from a database that contains
all the information capitalized during past operations. The
extracted knowledge is equivalent to an “opinion” expressed on
the frame of discernment, Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn}.
The statistical database can be summarized as a table that
contains all past cases. It synthesizes all the observations
regarding the simultaneous occurrence of model events (causes,
consequences, and defects). Statistical knowledge extraction
involves counting the number of cases that satisfies the con-
ditions of each variable and storing this number in a table.
Th tables that contain the results of the statistical extraction
must then be transformed into BBA to be incorporated into the
model. To take into account knowledge induced by statistical
laws, Denoeux [20] proposed the predictive belief function for-
malism. It allows a BBA that represents future occurrences of
X to be built from a number n of observations of a random
variable X .
A representative sample {X1, . . . , Xn} is taken from a
random variable X with an unknown probability distribu-
tion, denoted PX . The objective is to build a BBA, denoted
mΩ (.;X), that is less committed (within the meaning of the
least commitment principle [19]) than PX in 100× (1− α)%
of cases. The coefficient α allows us to specify the confidence
interval in the result. The predictive belief functions are based
on two conditions.
1) If PX is known, the credibility associated with mΩ (.;X)
should be equal to PX
(
belΩ (.;X) = PX
)
. However, this
constraint is infeasible and must be simplified by relaxing
some constraints, which eventually yields the following
expression:
∀A ⊂ Ω, belΩ (A;X) Prob→ PX (A) , for n → ∞.
2) If n is finite, then belΩ (.;X) should be less committed
than PX most of the time, i.e., in 100× (1− α)% of the
cases. Thus, it follows:
Prob
(
belΩ (A;X) ≤ PX (A) ∀A ⊂ Ω
) ≥ 1− α.
When X is a discrete variable on a frame of discernment
Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωK}, as in this study, a solution can be found
using simultaneous confidence intervals on the probabilities
pk = P(X = ωk). By definition, the intervals
[
P−k , P
+
k
]
, k =
1, . . . , K are simultaneous confidence intervals with a confi-
dence level of 1− α if they satisfy the following constraint:
P
(
P−k ≤ pk ≤ P+k , k = 1, . . . , K
) ≥ 1− α. (9)
The choice of confidence level 1− α allows a compromise
between confidence interval size and the probability that the
real probability value is in this interval. The asymptotic simul-
taneous confidence intervals proposed by Goodman [21] are
obtained by Chi2 approximation of the polynomial distribution:
P−k =
b+ 2Nk −
√
Δk
2 (n+ b)
(10)
P+k =
b+ 2Nk +
√
Δk
2 (n+ b)
(11)
where n is the total number of observations, Nk is the number
of observations in the category ωk, b = χ21− αK (1) is the fractile
of the Chi2 law at the level 1− αK with a degree of freedom of
1, and Δk = b
(
b+ 4Nk(n−Nk)n
)
.
The BBA construction from this simultaneous confidence
interval differs according to the number of hypotheses K.
Therefore, the following holds depending on the cardinality of
the frame of discernment.
1) If K = 2, then P− is a belief function
mΩ ({ω1}) = P−1
mΩ ({ω2}) = P−2
mΩ ({Ω}) = 1− P−1 − P−2 .
(12)
2) If K = 3, then P− is also a belief function
mΩ ({ωk}) = P−k , k = 1, 2, 3
mΩ ({ω1, ω2}) = 1− P+3 − P−1 − P−2
mΩ ({ω1, ω3}) = 1− P+2 − P−1 − P−3
mΩ ({ω2, ω3}) = 1− P+1 − P−2 − P−3
mΩ ({Ω}) = bn+b .
(13)
3) If K > 3, then P− is generally not a belief function
because it does not necessarily satisfy the formal defini-
tion of a belief function [20]. Since this situation was not
necessary in this study, this idea will not be developed
further.
IV. FUSION OF OPINIONS
Belief function formalism provides various rules that allow
the fusion of several opinions resulting from heterogeneous
sources. The two most common rules are the conjunctive rule
of combination (CRC), denoted ©∩ , which allows the fusion of
BBA from distinct and reliable sources and the disjunctive rule
of combination (DRC), denoted ©∪ , which allows the fusion of
BBA from distinct sources when at least one of the sources is
reliable. The CRC formula is presented as(
mΩ1 ©∩ mΩ2
)
(A) =
∑
B∩C=A
mΩ1 (B) .m
Ω
2 (C) ∀A,B,C⊆Ω. (14)
The DRC formula is presented as
(
mΩ1 ©∪ mΩ2
)
(A) =
∑
B∪C=A
mΩ1 (B) .m
Ω
2 (C) ∀A⊆Ω. (15)
In this study, the CRC or DRC methods could not be used,
because the sources are not independent (nondistinct) since dif-
ferent experts share the same information ground to elaborate
their opinions. Since the sources are considered reliable—the
source reliability is already taken into account during knowl-
edge formalization via the use of discounting and predictive
belief functions—the choice was made to use the cautious con-
junctive rule of combination (CCRC) to merge expert opinions
with the database. This approach allows knowledge from reli-
able but nondistinct sources. The CCRC, proposed by Denoeux
[22], uses the canonical decomposition introduced by Shafer
[16]. The canonical decomposition consists of expressing a
nondogmatic BBA (nondogmatic means mΩ ({Ω}) > 0) using
a conjunctive combination of simple BBA, denoted Aw(A).
Since Aw(A) is a simple BBA, it only contains two focal ele-
ments: mΩ (A) = 1− w (A) and mΩ (Ω) = w (A). Smets [23]
defined the notion of a simple generalized BBA (GSBBA) to
define a BBA canonical decomposition. A GSBBA is defined
by a function μ : 2Ω →  such that
μ (A) = 1− w
μ (Ω) = w
μ (B) = 0, ∀B ∈ 2Ω \ {A, Ω}
with B = Ω and where w ∈ (0, +∞) .
The CCRC uses the notion of GSBBA and the “minimum”
t-norm operator, denoted ∧, to combine distributions. The
CCRC, denoted ©∧ , can be written as follows:
wΩ1©∧ 2 (A) =
(
wΩ1 ©∧ wΩ2
)
(A) = wΩ1 (A) ∧ wΩ2 (A)
mΩ1©∧ 2 (A) =
(
mΩ1 ©∧ mΩ2
)
(A) = 1− wΩ1©∧ 2 (A)
∀A ⊆ Ω.
(16)
Note that the CCRC generates a mass assigned to the empty
set
(
mΩ (∅) = 0). Information on the empty set can be very
useful because it represents conflict between the information
sources [24]. However, when the number of experts grows,
the number of uses of the combination rule and therefore
the mass attributed to the conflict increases. Therefore, the
BBA resulting from the fusion before processing the directed
evidential network must be normalized [24] to prevent the
conflict from becoming the predominant information. This phe-
nomenon reduces the influence of other information in the
directed evidential network and justifies the use of the normal-
ized CCRC
(m1©∧ ∗m2) (A) =
{
(m1©∧ m2)(A)
1−(m1©∧ m2)(∅) ∀A ⊆ Ω if A = ∅
0 if A = ∅.
(17)
V. PROCESSING WITH DIRECTED EVIDENTIAL NETWORKS
After presenting the knowledge formalization and the meth-
ods to combine it, the processing of this knowledge to achieve
risk assessment will be discussed. As mentioned earlier, this
study aims to extend the risk assessment process developed
with Bayesian networks into an evidential framework based
on belief functions. To this end, directed evidential networks,
introduced by Yaghlane [25], are used. This formalism is
similar to Bayesian networks [2] but uses conditional belief
functions instead of conditional probabilities. Each edge of
the network represents a conditional relationship between two
variables, represented by nodes. Each variable is defined on a
frame of discernment that represents the set of possible val-
ues. Nodes without a parent are characterized by a priori belief
functions, and nodes with parents are characterized by condi-
tional belief functions (i.e., BBA conditionally to the values of
their parents).
The generalized bayes theorem (GBT) and the DRC are
used to infer and propagate knowledge in the network. The
Bayes theorem is a probabilistic inference mechanism used in
Bayesian networks. It can bind a series of hypotheses, char-
acterized by occurrence probabilities, with a series of observa-
tions that represent the actual state of the system. The GBT [26]
is the generalization of this mechanism to the TBM.
The hypothesis space is termed Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θi} and
the observation space is termed Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωk}. To
represent links between observations and hypotheses, nota-
tion related to conditional belief functions is used (plΩ [θ] is
the plausibility on Ω conditioned by θ, where [] symbolizes
conditioning). A directed evidential network is composed of
nodes and edges. An edge represents the causal relationship
between nodes. From the perspective of the variables, which
are represented by nodes, the edge indicates that the node Ω,
which represents the observation space, is conditioned by the
node Θ, which represents the hypothesis space. Therefore, the
plausibility distribution on Ω is plΩ [θ].
The node Θ is characterized by an a priori BBA, mΘ0 , and
the node Ω is characterized by a conditional BBA, mΩ [θ].
Knowledge is then propagated according to the edge direc-
tion if the node Θ receives a new distribution of masses, mΘ0 .
Therefore, the node Ω is updated with respect to this new infor-
mation. This propagation type, termed “forward propagation,”
allows the calculation of the plausibility distribution plΩ, using
the GBT and the DRC by taking into account the inclusion of a
priori knowledge
plΩ (ω) =
∑
θ⊆Θ
mΘ0 (θ)× plΩ [θ] (ω) ∀ω ⊆ Ω
plΩ [θ] (ω) = 1−
∏
θi∈Θ
(
1− plΩ [θi] (ω)
)
.
(18)
Knowledge can also be propagated in the opposite direc-
tion of the edge if the node Ω receives a new BBA, mΩ. The
node Θ is then updated to reflect this new information. This
step, termed “backward propagation,” allows for the calculation
of the plausibility distribution plΘ, using the following equa-
tion, which is based on the GBT, to determine the plausibility
plΘ [ωi]:
plΘ(θ) =
∑
ω⊆Ω
mΩ(ω)×
(
1−
∏
ωi∈ω
(
1− plΘ[ωi](θ)
)) ∀θ ⊆ Θ
plΘ [ω] (θ) = 1−
∏
θi∈θ
(
1− plΩ [θi] (ω)
)
. (19)
If both nodes have to be updated because new knowledge has
been assigned to the two nodes, knowledge must be propagated
first by using forward propagation and then by using backward
propagation. Finally, the results of the two propagation cycles
are merged using the CRC.
VI. RESULTING INDICATORS
The main drawback of belief functions is that a user who
does not have the required background knowledge cannot easily
interpret them. The introduction of indicators for decision-
makers is very important. Two indicators are introduced to
ensure maximum accuracy. A risk indicator is proposed and an
uncertainty indicator is developed to balance the information
conveyed by the risk indicator according to the data quality.
A. Risk Indicator
The chosen solution to assess risk is to use the credibility and
plausibility distributions to calculate minimum and maximum
risks. At this stage, the introduction of the notion of compatible
probabilities is important to achieve this purpose. If a proba-
bility distribution P and a BBA, m, represented by credibility
(bel) and plausibility (pl) distributions represent the occurrence
of the same event, they are said to be compatible if and only if
bel (A) ≤ P (A) ≤ pl (A) . (20)
In this case, this constraint is considered verified. Two mea-
sures can be deduced: the minimum risk R, and the maximum
risk R. These measures are determined using a utility func-
tion, which represents impact levels because of consequence
events in a system. It is expressed as a value on a scale of
0 to 100 according to the consequence state (the sum of the
impacts of different consequence states must be less than or
equal to 100). The minimum risk is calculated by multiplying
the credibility and impact for each singleton of the frame of dis-
cernment, followed by the addition of these results expressed on
each singleton. The maximum risk exploits the same formula
but uses plausibility instead of credibility. The formulas deter-
mining these measures for a BBA, mΩ, with a credibility belΩ,
a plausibility plΩ, and an impact IΩ are
RΩ =
∑
ωi∈Ω
IΩ (ωi)× belΩ (ωi) (21)
RΩ =
∑
ωi∈Ω
IΩ (ωi)× plΩ (ωi) . (22)
With this method, the decision-maker can adopt differ-
ent strategies to compare the results of optimistic (using the
minimum risk) and pessimistic (using the maximum risk)
approaches.
Counterbalancing the risk indicator according to the different
information quality properties that are introduced in the eviden-
tial networks is very important. Providing only a risk measure,
while the network addresses imperfect information, would be
too restrictive and would represent an overall information loss.
So, putting some information into perspective regarding the
data quality that led to this result is important. Therefore,
an indicator that represents the global level of uncertainty is
proposed.
B. Uncertainty Indicator
To assess the uncertainty level of each model variable, the
measure of nonspecificity is used [27]. It determines the BBA
uncertainty rate and is assessed by the amount of informa-
tion assigned to the power set subsets with a cardinality higher
than one. This measure (23) weights more heavily the elements
with highest cardinality. This approach characterizes a larger
uncertainty because it is applied to more than one hypothesis
N (m) =
∑
∅=A⊆Ω
m (A)× log2 (|A|) (23)
with N (m) ∈ [0, log2 (|Ω|)] and |A| the proposal cardinality.
However, this measure provides a numerical result that is dif-
ficult to interpret. Therefore, we propose to use a percentage
of the maximum nonspecificity, i.e., the nonspecificity of the
empty BBA that represents total ignorance. From a mathemati-
cal point of view, this new measure, denoted N%, is expressed
by the following formula:
N% (m) =
∑
∅=A⊆Ω
m (A)× log2 (|A|)
log2 (|Ω|)
. (24)
More detailed information for the decision-maker can also
be obtained by separating the partial and total uncertainty. The
decision-maker can determine whether the value of nonspeci-
ficity measure reflects total ignorance or whether the knowl-
edge used to make the decision contains useful information.
Therefore, two alternative measures, denoted Np% (for partial
uncertainty) and Nt% (for total uncertainty), are proposed and
determined by the following formulas:
Np% (m) =
∑
∅=A⊂Ω
m (A)× log2 (|A|)
log2 (|Ω|)
(25)
Nt% (m) =
m (Ω)× log2 (|Ω|)
log2 (|Ω|)
= m (Ω) . (26)
Notably, Np% (m) +Nt% (m) = N% (m). The N% mea-
sure indicates the uncertainty level of a BBA. An uncertainty
categorization scale similar to the one used for risk can be
created to allow the decision-maker to interpret the result.
VII. APPLICATION TO AIRCRAFT DECONSTRUCTION
By using knowledge generated during aircraft deconstruc-
tion, a decision-support system has been established to facilitate
knowledge management, especially during the plane inspection
phase. A module was developed to analyze and take advantage
of the knowledge generated during this inspection phase. This
experience feedback tool provides the decision-maker with an
opportunity to match the functioning conditions of the aircraft
with different defects in critical airplane areas via statistical and
expert analyses. This framework allows for the development of
an application to assess risk in critical parts and areas of an air-
plane. This tool uses a database and a statistical analysis module
that are deployed in the DIAGNOSTAT project.
The database contains the following informations: 1) the
characteristics of each aircraft (type, option, . . .); 2) the living
and using conditions (long-haul or national flights, mainte-
nance, etc.); and 3) the various defects encountered during
deconstruction and/or maintenance. The statistical analysis
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE TABLE OF THE EVENT RELATED TO THE STUDY CASE
module puts information into perspective to generate usable
statistics. The capabilities of this tool are enhanced by asso-
ciating a risk assessment module, which, in addition to the raw
statistics from the statistical analysis module, integrates some
expert knowledge to assess the risk for critical areas of the
aircraft.
A case-study has been developed to implement the risk
assessment model, according to DIAGNOSTAT project objec-
tives and in partnership with an expert in the field of composite
aircraft spare parts. The model exhibits three defects and their
respective causes and consequences for a system composed of
two composite panels. Table I summarizes the modeling of the
study case using the risk assessment model that is illustrated in
Fig. 6. Each node in the graphical view is linked to a variable
with a code described in Table I.
A scenario as applied to aircraft deconstruction was devel-
oped to illustrate how this model behaves. In this scenario,
the decision-maker does not possess additional knowledge to
inform the model upon aircraft arrival (he knows nothing of
the past life of the unit). During the aircraft inspection oper-
ations, a surface defect is observed (P11=Yes), and previous
repairs show patch debonding (P21=Yes). Using the model, the
decision-maker is able to assess the risk that a defect is present
in the system and to evaluate whether the part is reusable. The
addition of knowledge obtained during the inspection of the
plane will allow this assessment to be refined.
A prototype has been developed to integrate the mechanisms
presented above and to validate this study.
A. Process Flow
As stated above, knowledge is retrieved from two separate
sources: a database [Fig. 5(a)] and expert opinion capital-
ized using subjective probabilities [Fig. 5(b)]. The statistical
knowledge, extracted from the database by conditional count-
ing, is converted into belief functions using predictive belief
functions (Section III-C). Subjective probabilities that repre-
sent the expert knowledge are transformed into belief functions
Fig. 5. Initial knowledge overview. (a) Database example. (b) Expert opinion
example.
using inverse pignistic transformation (Section III-B). Once this
knowledge is formalized, opinions from these two sources are
merged using the Normalized CCRC (Section IV). At this point,
a BBA that represents the combined knowledge is obtained for
each variable in the model. These BBAs are then introduced
into the directed evidential network and a first phase of process-
ing is launched (Section V). The results at the end of this first
phase are presented in Section VII-B. Finally, during inspec-
tion of the airplane, new knowledge is discovered and added
to the directed evidential network by modifying the contents of
the variables, and a new processing phase is launched to obtain
results revised according to the additional knowledge. These
results are presented in Section VII-C.
B. Results Before Knowledge Addition
Fig. 6(a) presents the results of the model before the intro-
duction of knowledge related to the scenario. Four types of
nodes exist in this modeling.
1) Chance nodes that represent belief in the occurrence of an
event [i.e., node C11 in Fig. 6(a)]. These nodes contain a
graphical indicator that represents belief and uncertainty.
A belief in the positive result of the event (C11 does not
occur) is represented by the light gray part of the bar. A
belief in the negative result of the event (C11 occurs) is
represented by the dark gray part of the bar. The length of
the bar is inversely proportional to the uncertainty.
2) Chance nodes frozen by knowledge addition represent an
event that has occurred with certainty [i.e., node P11 in
Fig. 6(b)].
3) Utility nodes represent the impact of a consequence [i.e.,
node I11 in Fig. 6(a)]. The impact value of the negative
event, contained in the node, is always between 0 and 100
(see Section VI-A).
4) Decision nodes represent the risk measure, R and R, of
a consequence [i.e., node R11 in Fig. 6(a)]. These nodes
contain a graphical indicator that represents minimum and
maximum risk measures (see Section VI-A). The length
of the bar is proportional to the risk measure.
The first observation shows that the uncertainty is very impor-
tant in the chance nodes located at the bottom of the network.
This uncertainty affects the risk indicator that shows a large gap
between the minimum and maximum risk. The number of lev-
els in the network is supposed to correlate positively with the
degree of uncertainty created by propagation mechanisms.
Fig. 6. Results of processing with directed evidential networks. (a) Initial processing. (b) After the addition of scenario knowledge.
C. Results After Knowledge Addition
The scenario begins by setting P11 and P21 nodes
(mP11 ({Yes}) = 1 and mP21 ({Yes}) = 1). Fig. 6(b) presents
results of this scenario after adding knowledge obtained during
inspection.
The consistency of the evolution of results can be verified.
A significant decrease in uncertainty of the resulting network
is visible. Therefore, the risk measures are more accurate. The
uncertainty, and thus the gap between minimum and maxi-
mum risk measures, is reduced by increasing the minimum risk
because, in this case, the added knowledge addresses the occur-
rence of negative events (P11 and P21). However, it should
be noted that the reduction in uncertainty can also be done
by adding knowledge about the nonoccurrence of a negative
event, which will reduce the maximum risk. The importance
of the uncertainty generated by the propagation mechanism is
supposed to correlate positively with the distance (propagation
steps) of the studied node from the node where knowledge is
introduced.
D. General Remarks About the Model
These results represent a “rough” model with relatively sub-
stantial uncertainty. Indeed, the choice of belief functions and
therefore directed evidential networks is related to the fact that
there is a lack of sufficient data to address the problem statis-
tically. This lack of data creates uncertainty, which affects the
final results.
To illustrate the importance of uncertainty on the final result,
some tests that vary the uncertainty level of the “Cause” nodes
(C11 to C22) were conducted on two model states (i.e., before
and after the addition of knowledge). Fig. 7 illustrates the
impact of the mean uncertainty level of the “Cause” nodes on
the “Consequence” nodes (P11 to P32) before the addition of
knowledge. The uncertainty level on each node has been quan-
tified through the uncertainty measure, N% (Section VI-B). The
uncertainty on the “Cause” nodes had a significant impact on
the “Consequence” nodes. Moreover, the uncertainty on inter-
mediate levels (nodes D) affects these “Consequence” nodes
significantly. This is why the uncertainty level of the most dis-
tant “Consequence” nodes from the “Cause” nodes (P31 and
P32) is always greater than 85% regardless of the uncertainty
level of the “Cause” nodes.
The same tests were conducted after knowledge addition,
i.e., after certain knowledge injection in the model (NP11% =
NP21% = 0). A significant reduction in uncertainty on the P31
and P32 nodes is observed. The same trend can be observed for
other “Consequence” nodes but the variation is less important.
Table II summarizes these findings.
These tests demonstrate the utility of the uncertainty measure
proposed in Section VI-B to inform the decision-maker when
Fig. 7. Influence of “Cause” node uncertainty on the “Consequence” nodes.
TABLE II
IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE ADDITION ON THE UNCERTAINTY LEVEL
IN THE MODEL
there is a need to add knowledge in the model (e.g., requesting
an extensive aircraft inspection) if the uncertainty level is too
great.
According to [26], the model will gradually approach its
probabilistic counterpart if the amount of data increases. Thus,
the result will be the same that obtained with Bayesian networks
if the data set used contains only Bayesian BBA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented an approach designed to assess the risk
during the deconstruction of end-of-life aircraft. This approach
allows for the formalization, combination, and processing of
uncertain knowledge resulting from heterogeneous information
sources. The heterogeneity of information sources used in this
study is related to the nature of the feedback mechanisms used
in industry, i.e., cognitive and statistical experience feedbacks.
Moreover, some indicators that allow the decision-maker to be
informed about the risk level but also about the data quality
concerning the uncertainty have been developed.
The prospects of this research work relate mainly to two
issues.
First, understanding the behavior of the risk assessment
model based on directed evidential networks faced with uncer-
tainty appears to be important. As shown above, the risk
assessment approach based on directed evidential networks
yields results with significant uncertainty. This uncertainty
arises because of uncertainty in the initial data and that gen-
erated by the propagation mechanisms. Testing this hypothesis
and understanding the influence of these two factors on the final
result would be interesting. A series of tests designed to explain
the impact of uncertainty on the behavior of the original model
and to characterize the influence of different propagation steps
in a directed evidential network on the increase in uncertainty
can be implemented. Furthermore, the choice of combination
rule has a direct impact on the proportion of conflict and uncer-
tainty in the results. Because the CCRC method was used to
merge expert opinions and statistics and CRC and DRC mech-
anisms were used to instrument inference in directed evidential
networks, determining the influence, in terms of uncertainty, of
the choice of the combination rule on final indicator wouIn-
fluence of “Cause” node uncertainty on the “Consequence”
nodes.ld be interesting. In addition, building directed eviden-
tial networks based on CCRC to reflect that the variables of the
problem represented by a directed evidential network could be
considered to be nondistinct constitutes another challenge.
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